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ABStRACt
International Investment Agreements are instruments used by states to attract foreign 
ventures within their borders and obtain favourable treatment to local investors in coun-
terpart nations. states usually compromise a certain degree of sovereignty in this kind 
of agreements through the inclusion of legal stability agreements, stabilisation clauses, 
compensation for expropriation, and fair & equitable treatment provisions. Within the 
context of this kind of agreements, the legitimate exercise of regulatory powers by states 
enters in conflict with the protection of foreign investors property rights when it comes 
to sensitive areas that have a high impact in the public interest, politics and public per-
ception (such as human rights, health, safety, labour standards and the environment). 
Based on the discussion of two recent paramount cases that involve regulatory actions 
of the Colombian state and property rights of foreign investors (pharmaceutical iP rights 
vs public health interests in the first case, consolidated mining titles vs environmental 
protection in the second case), we identify and criticize the difficulties of defining if a 
governmental regulatory action is legitimate and non-compensable or if it is subject to 
compensation as an indirect expropriation, and the high dependence of this matter on 
the interpretation of arbitral tribunals.
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LA tENSIóN ENtRE EL DERECHO DE LOS EStADOS A REGULAR  
y La Protección de La inversión extranjera. discusión  
a Partir deL anÁLisis de casos ParadiGmÁticos en coLomBia
RESUmEN
Los Acuerdos Internacionales de Inversión son instrumentos utilizados por los estados 
para atraer empresas extranjeras dentro de sus fronteras y obtener un trato favorable para 
los inversores locales en el exterior. Los estados suelen comprometer un cierto grado de 
soberanía en este tipo de instrumentos mediante la inclusión de acuerdos de estabilidad 
jurídica, cláusulas de estabilización, compensación por expropiación y disposiciones de 
trato justo y equitativo. en el contexto de este tipo de acuerdos, el ejercicio legítimo 
de los poderes reguladores por parte de los Estados entra en conflicto con la protección 
de los derechos de propiedad de los inversionistas extranjeros cuando se trata de áreas 
sensibles que tienen un alto impacto en el interés general, la política y la percepción 
pública (como los derechos humanos, la salud, la seguridad, las normas laborales y el 
medio ambiente). A partir de la discusión de dos casos recientes que involucran acciones 
regulatorias del estado colombiano y derechos de propiedad de inversionistas extranjeros 
(derechos de Pi farmacéuticos versus intereses de salud pública en el primer caso, títulos 
mineros consolidados versus protección ambiental en el segundo caso), realizamos un 
análisis de las dificultades que conlleva definir si una medida reglamentaria gubernamen-
tal es legítima y no indemnizable o si está sujeta a indemnización como expropiación 
indirecta, así como de la alta dependencia de este asunto en la interpretación de los 
tribunales arbitrales.
Palabras clave: acuerdos internacionales de inversión - expropiación indirecta - 
ejercicio legítimo de poderes regulatorios - derechos de propiedad de los inversionistas 
extranjeros - derechos de Pi farmacéuticos - salud pública - titulaciones mineras con-
solidadas - Protección del medio ambiente.
INtRODUCtION
Will you deposit your lifetime savings in a precarious bank? should an investment fund 
support a project in an unstable country? A major driver for investment decisions is 
trust. the higher the confidence about the steadiness of the host of a potential inves-
tment, the lower the risk related to such investment and therefore, the lower the costs 
of the venture. taking into account the nature of most investments, supporting a certain 
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venture depends not only on the current conditions of a host country, but also in the 
anticipations about the future behaviour of its government and its potential effects on 
investments and financial costs3.
From the perspective of project finance, the perception of investors about the stea-
diness of host countries is measured as political risk. this kind of risk is regarded as ‘the 
possibility that political decisions, events or conditions in a country, including those 
that might be referred to as social, will affect the business environment such that investors 
will lose money or have a reduced profit margin’4. the shift in the existing business envi-
ronment of a country may be the consequence of transfers of power, major swings in the 
economic model and policy, political or social shocks, or regular policymaking5.
the probability of an expropriation is usually the major concern of foreign investors 
within the assessment of the political risk of a host country. in recent years, some other 
measures are included in the list of variables to be analysed during the assessment of the 
political risk of an investment: the exercise of regulatory powers, ‘operational restrictions, 
restrictions on the repatriation of profits, breaches of contracts by the host government, 
and discriminatory taxation’6. these measures are examples of what is called indirect –or 
creeping– expropriation7.
in the realm of political risk assessment, there is an ongoing academic discussion about 
the tension between states’ right to regulate and the protection of foreign investments 
within the framework of international investment agreements (‘iias’). the discussion is 
related to the scope and extent of states’ compensatory responsibilities towards foreign 
investors’ proprietary rights whenever those rights are affected by a regulatory action8.
Within this background, our research will focus on the analysis of governmental 
regulatory powers as a factor of political risk in the context of international investment 
law. to contribute to the academic debate, the purpose of this research paper is to discuss 
the difference between the legitimate exercise of regulatory powers and compensable 
indirect expropriation in the context of international investment commitments. the 
discussion will be based on the analysis of two recent cases of potentially expropriating 
action of the government of the Republic of Colombia that include all the ingredients 
for a remarkable debate: pharmaceutical iP rights vs public health interests in the first 
case, consolidated mining rights vs environmental protection in the second case.
the first section of the paper will present the background of states’ right to regulate 
in international investment law and its impact in political risk assessment, particularly 
3 all translations are by the author, except otherwise indicated.
 PhilliP harms, International Investment Political Risk and Growth (new york: springer, 2000), 72.
4 lewellyn howell and brad chaddick, ‘models of Political risk for Foreign investment and trade an 
assessment of three approaches’ (1994), 29 Columbia Journal of World Business 70. (emphasis added).
5 ibid.
6 ibid., 73.
7 tullio treves, Francesco seatzu, and seline trevisanut (eds.), Foreign investment international law and 
common concerns (abingdon, oxon: routledge, 2014), 219.
8 aikaterini titi, The right to regulate in international investment law (Baden-Baden: nomos, 2014).
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focused on the tension between the legitimate exercise of regulatory powers (which is 
not subject to compensation) and indirect expropriation (subject to prompt, adequate and 
effective compensation), as well as the criteria used to differentiate both circumstances.
the second section of the paper will present the analysis of two paramount recent 
colombian cases as an example of the tension between non-compensable exercise of 
regulatory power and creeping expropriation, taking into account the significance of this 
kind of decisions for the assessment of political risk in project finance. in this section we 
will discuss the viability of the claims of the investors against the Colombian state by 
applying the criteria presented in the first section. Finally, the conclusion section will 
acknowledge the difficulties that entail the differentiation between legitimate regulatory 
actions and compensable expropriating measures, and the lessons to be learned from a 
project finance perspective.
i. states’ riGht to reGuLate in internationaL investment LaW  
AND ItS ImPACt IN POLItICAL RISk ASSESSmENt
the main purpose of international investment agreements (‘iias’) is the promotion and 
protection of foreign investments in a host nation9. iias are intended to attract foreign 
investment to a country and to promote local investments abroad by creating favourable 
conditions and stable legal regimes for overseas investors. iias aim to provide clear and 
predictable rules for foreign investors by giving them protection, clarity and safety for 
their investments10.
iias commonly stipulate international arbitration mechanisms available for foreign 
investors to pursue claims against the host state for the enforcement of commitments 
under the agreement. Such provisions remove the dependence on local courts and the 
burden for investors of getting their home state support11.
the aspiration of states when entering in iias is to attract foreign investments and 
at the same time obtain protection for local investors abroad. the price to pay for this 
purpose is the necessary relinquishment of a certain degree of sovereignty from incum-
bent states in the form of legal stability agreements, stabilisation clauses, compensation 
for expropriation, and fair & equitable treatment stipulations12.
It is a common practice in iias to include a number of provisions intended to pro-
tect foreign investors’ property rights from risks that are not inherently related to the 
commercial activity of the venture (e.g. political risk)13. those provisions involve ‘the 
9 ibid., 19.
10 ministry of commerce, industry and tourism of the republic of colombia, Acuerdos Internacionales de 
Inversión [international investment agreements] <http://www.tlc.gov.co/publicaciones.php?id=6126>
11 henninG Grosse ruse-kahn, Protection of intellectual property in international law (oxford: oxford university 
Press, 2016), 151.
12 titi, above n 6, 19.
13 treves, seatzu and trevisanut (eds), above n 5, 26.
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prohibition of expropriation without prompt, adequate and effective compensation, and 
the obligation to provide foreign investors fair and equitable treatment’14.
the shared ground of this kind of stipulations is the restraint of the states’ right to 
regulate to favour investors’ trust in the reliability and stability of the political environ-
ment of the host nation. the problem with states’ commitments to reduce political risk 
is its wide-range and a priori nature, which usually leaves a substantial amount of grey 
areas where the manoeuvrability of regulatory power is uncertain regarding investors’ 
rights and entitlements15.
restraining regulatory powers as a strategy to reduce political risk within iias crea-
tes a tension between investors’ rights and states’ core responsibilities –which are often 
more important that the promotion of foreign investment–. As pointed out by the spe-
cialised literature:
“the pursuit of regulatory interests in nationally sensitive areas, such as essential security and 
the public order, human rights, sustainable economic growth, environmental protection, social 
and labour standards, cultural policy and the capacity to respond to situation of economic 
emergencies, has been circumscribed in order to give way to investment protection, enshrined 
in an ever-increasing number of international investment agreements”16.
these sensitive areas are usually under the spotlight for their direct relation to public 
interest, having frequently an extra power of pressure over governments given its im-
pact on politics and public perception. it is currently a matter of discussion the extent 
to which developing economies are lowering their standards and over-constraining the 
scope of regulatory powers in iias as a strategy to increase foreign investment17.
states should be extremely diligent in the assessment of the extent of the commitments 
they subscribe under iias that entail a restriction of their regulatory powers, taking into 
account that investors are usually entitled to pursue compensation against states for the 
breach of agreed limitations and for direct and indirect expropriating actions18.
expropriation is commonly recognised as a power retained by host states. never-
theless, strict rules for the legitimate exercise of that power are set in iia’s to protect 
investors’ property rights and to deter states from recurring to such extreme measure. 
those guidelines often include that the expropriation should pursue a public purpose, 
14 Ibid.
15 titi, above n 6, 19.
16 Ibid.
17 treves, seatzu and trevisanut (eds), above n 5, 26.
18 ‘the issue directly relates to the very core of the pursuit of common concerns, since drawing the line 
between indirect expropriation and legitimate regulation implies assessing the state to which a state 
can legitimately pursue policies of public interest without falling under the obligation to compensate 
foreign investors’. ibid., 37.
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that is done over non-discriminatory grounds, following due process of law, and entitling 
the investor to full compensation19.
expropriation can be classified as direct and indirect. according to specialised in-
ternational investment law sources:
“an expropriation is direct where the host state takes title to, or possession of, the investment 
for its own use or for the use of a third party. It is indirect where the investor continues to 
have title to and possession of the investment, but the value of the investment to the investor 
has been destroyed as a result of the host state’s regulatory activity. indirect expropriation 
has also been described as ‘regulatory expropriation’ (or regulatory taking). many investment 
treaties expressly clarify that they also apply to indirect expropriation”20.
the boundary between the legitimate exercise of regulatory powers (which is not subject 
to compensation) and indirect expropriation (subject to prompt, adequate and effecti-
ve compensation) is one of the main subjects of discussion in international investment 
law given its profound effect on investors’ economic interests and its high reliance on 
interpretation21.
how to define this boundary? the united states22 and Canadian23 models of bila-
teral investment treaties (‘bits’) –usually used as reference in the drafting of this kind of 
agreements– offer us some useful criteria to determine if a host state action should be 
considered the legitimate exercise of regulatory powers or an indirect expropriation24.
according to these models, “the distinction between indirect expropriation and 
the legitimate exercise of regulatory powers requires a case-by-case, fact-based inquiry 
that considers, among others, the economic impact, the degree of interference with the 
investor’s reasonable expectations, and the character of the governmental action”25. the 
models also recommend that a regulatory action of a host nation should not be conside-
red as an indirect expropriation when it is adopted on a non-discriminatory basis and is 
intended to protect public interest objectives (e.g. health, safety or the environment)26.
another helpful benchmark for the analysis of regulatory measures in the realm of 
international investment protection is case law from arbitral tribunals that have pre-
viously solved investment disputes between states and foreign investors. According to 
19 ibid., 36.
20 Ibid.
21 ‘indirect expropriation must be distinguished from the legitimate exercise of state jurisdiction or “pólice 
powers”, which, to the contrary, do not require payment of compensation.’ ibid., 37.
22 office of the united states trade representative, us 2012 Model bit < https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/
bit%20text%20for%20acieP%20meeting.pdf>
23 italaw, Canada 2003 Model bit <http://www.italaw.com/documents/canadian2004-FiPa-model-en.pdf>
24 ‘these criteria are included in all recent us Ftas and bits and have been argued to reflect customary in-
ternational law’. Grosse ruse-kahn, above n 9, 189.
25 treves, seatzu and trevisanut (eds), above n 5, 37.
26 Ibid.
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yannaca-small27, arbitral tribunals use the following criteria to differentiate between 
the legitimate exercise of regulatory powers and indirect expropriation: (i) the grade of 
intrusion in the investors’ property right; (ii) the drive and background of the regula-
tory action; (iii) the proportionality of the regulatory action assessed in relation to the 
government’s public policy purpose and the affectation of investor’s rights; (iv) the grade 
of alteration of the legitimate expectations of the investor28.
as we can see, the assessment of the potential expropriating nature of a regulatory 
action is fundamentally based on the analysis of the relevant case, including the apprai-
sal of the factual background of the regulatory decision, the impact on the reasonable 
economic expectations of the investor, the compliance with fair & equitable principles, 
the proportionality and the public interest inspiration of the regulatory measure. the 
evident problem with these criteria is that they can be highly subjective, extremely 
difficult to precise, and ultimately contingent upon arbitral definition.
Within this context, in the following section we will apply the discussed criteria 
by analysing governmental decisions in two different scenarios that have traditionally 
triggered tensions from the perspective of foreign investors’ rights: the protection of 
pharmaceutical inventions through patents and the restriction of mining activities in 
environmentally protected ecosystems.
ii. the tension BetWeen states’ riGht to reGuLate and ForeiGn investment 
PROtECtION: CASE ANALySIS
as discussed above, the appropriate way to assess the legitimacy of a regulatory action is 
by studying the concrete background, facts and motivations of the measures in individual 
cases. Following the purpose of this research paper, and in order to get a close look of 
this crucial element of political risk management, in this section we are going to analy-
se two paramount recent cases of potentially expropriating actions of the government 
of the republic of colombia that mix all the ingredients for a remarkable discussion: 
pharmaceutical iP rights vs public health interests in the first case, consolidated mining 
rights vs environmental protection in the second case.
the analysis will be preceded by a brief country overview that gives context about 
the economy, the international investment status and commitments of colombia.
A. Country overview
the Republic of Colombia is a country located in South America. It has a geographica-
lly strategic position with shores in both the caribbean sea and the Pacific ocean, and 
shared borders with venezuela, Panama, ecuador, Peru and Brazil. it has a population of 
27 katia yannaca-small, Arbitration under international investment agreements: a guide to key issues (oxford: ouP, 
2010), 460.
28 treves, seatzu and trevisanut (eds), above n 5, 38.
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around 49 million people (most of them spanish speakers) and a GdP of us $293 billions 
(us $6083.5 per capita)29.
Colombia is considered a developing Country. Its economic potential has been 
constrained by a long-run internal armed conflict with Farc guerrillas and other violent 
armed groups. economic growth in colombia has also been constrained by corruption, 
infrastructure underdevelopment and poor industrialisation30.
the Colombian economy has shown signs of stability and moderate growth in the 
last few years. this recent improvement is attributed to high commodities prices, re-
gulatory enhancements, efficient macroeconomic and fiscal management and a strong 
investment attraction policy31. there are high expectations about the strengthening of 
the Colombian economy in the following years given the closure and implementation 
of the peace agreement with Farc guerrillas, and the robust government strategy for the 
development of infrastructure projects32.
colombia has a well-established commitment to free trade and foreign investment, 
promoted within the framework of social market economy established in the colombian 
constitution of 1991. such framework comprises broad economic freedoms, including 
the freedoms of economic activity, private initiative, competition, and enterprise de-
velopment33.
According to trading Economics:
“Foreign direct investment in colombia increased by 1965.89 usd million in the third quarter 
of 2016. Foreign direct investment in colombia averaged 1929.35 usd million from 1996 
until 2016, reaching an all-time high of 6776.22 usd million in the fourth quarter of 2005 
and a record low of 197.17 usd million in the third quarter of 2002”34.
the Country has signed several free trade agreements with other nations around the world. 
according to the colombian ministry of commerce, industry and tourism (‘mcit’), the 
country has effective free trade agreements with mexico, el salvador, Guatemala, hon-
duras, chile, canada, united states, cuba, nicaragua, the european union, mercosur, 
caricom, south Korea and costa rica. the country also has ongoing negotiations for 
free trade agreements with turkey, japan, israel and Panama35, and is part of regional 
agreements that include free trade commitments, such as the andean community of 
29 klaus schwab and xavier sala-i-martín, ‘the Global competitiveness report 2016-2017’ (report, 
World economic Forum, 2016), 149.
30 the World Bank, Overview (26 september 2016) the World Bank <http://www.worldbank.org/en/coun-
try/colombia/overview#1>
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid.
33 Constitución Política de Colombia 1991 [colombian constitution 1991] art 334.
34 trading economics, Colombia Foreign Direct Investment <http://www.tradingeconomics.com/colombia/
foreign-direct-investment>
35 ministry of commerce, industry and tourism of the republic of colombia, Acuerdos Comerciales y de In-
versión [commercial and investment agreements] <http://www.tlc.gov.co/index.php>
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Nations (‘can’) including Bolivia, colombia, Peru and ecuador, as well as the Pacific 
alliance which integrates mexico, colombia, Peru and chile36.
Bilateral investment treaties (‘bit’s) are also in the Colombian agenda of international 
policy. up to this day, colombia has effective bit’s with mexico, chile, Guatemala, el 
salvador, honduras, eFta (swiss Federation-Liechtenstein-norway-iceland), canada, 
united states, spain, japan, Peru, china, india and the united Kingdom37. the Country 
has ongoing negotiations for bit’s with the european union, south Korea, singapore, 
France and turkey38.
B. Case 1: Price control over Glivec™
Foreword
as discussed in the previous section, the tension between the legitimate exercise of regu-
latory actions of a host government and compensable indirect expropriation of foreign 
investors’ property rights gets intensified when it comes to nationally sensitive matters 
that involve public interest, such as human rights, labour standards or environmental 
compliance. Public health –particularly the access to and affordability of medicines– has 
traditionally been a ground of pressure for the exercise of regulatory powers39.
the principal counterpart of states regarding public health regulations is the phar-
maceutical industry. this knowledge-based technology-intensive industry depends on a 
fundamental service provided by states: the recognition and enforcement of intellectual 
property (‘iP’) rights. the business model of the pharmaceutical industry is founded on 
the legal monopoly of new medicines through the consolidation of patent rights.40 Pa-
tents and iP rights are commonly included as protected investments in iias: “today, the 
model bits of most countries address IP rights.”41
the outstanding amount of research and testing that is required in the development 
of a new medicine is financed by pharmaceutical companies based on the expectation to 
commercialise the medicine in the future under exclusive rights derived from patents. 
36 ministry of commerce, industry and tourism of the republic of colombia, Acuerdos Vigentes [Effective 
agreements] <http://www.tlc.gov.co/publicaciones.php?id=5398>
37 ministry of commerce, industry and tourism of the republic of colombia, Acuerdos Internacionales de 
Inversión Vigentes [effective international investment agreements] <http://www.tlc.gov.co/publicaciones.
php?id=6420>
38 ministry of commerce, industry and tourism of the republic of colombia, Acuerdos Internacionales de In-
versión Suscritos [subscribed international investment agreements] <http://www.tlc.gov.co/publicaciones.
php?id=6421>
39 ‘the debate on patent protection for pharmaceutical products and access to life-saving drugs is probably 
the most commonly known example of international iP rules impacting on common societal interests 
(public health) as well as individual human rights (right to health).’ Grosse ruse-Kahn, above n 9, 10.
40 Pricewaterhousecoopers, Pharma 2020: Challenging business models Which path will you take? (report, Pri-
cewaterhousecoopers, 2009)
41 Grosse ruse-kahn, above n 9, 155.
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innovation in the pharmaceutical industry relies directly on the existence and enfor-
ceability of patent rights around the globe42.
On the other side of the coin we have health public policy and patient rights. An 
important part of health public policy in the xxi century is focused on preventive action 
and effective treatment of disease. these public policy goals can only be accomplished 
with an exponential increase of access to up-to-date medications to the entire popula-
tion –especially those with a higher risk of disease–43.
the treatment of potentially lethal and complex diseases raises questions in the realm 
of human rights. the medications to treat this kind of diseases are usually scarce and 
expensive. Patients usually cannot afford such treatments on their own. the financial 
support of governments and health insurers gets more restrained given the rising number 
of patients, high costs and limited funds.
the discussion is set within a background of two reasonable interests that are in 
conflict: on one hand, the genuine interest of pharmaceutical companies in protecting 
their iP rights through patents, and to set medicine prices that allow them to finance 
research and further developments; and on the other hand, the genuine interest of pa-
tients and governments in increasing the accessibility and affordability of medications, 
and therefore reduce mortality and increase life quality.
When this conflict of divergent interests rises within the context of international 
investment law it embodies an emblematic example of the tension between the  legitimate 
exercise of regulatory powers and compensable indirect expropriation. states will attempt 
to get reasonable prices of medicines (e.g. with price controls or compulsory licenses) 
while foreign investors (pharmaceutical companies) will defend their patent property 
rights, their exclusivity in markets and their prices.
Within this background, in the lines below we are going to discuss the recent deci-
sion of the Colombian government to impose a price control scheme over the medicine 
Glivec™ patented by the Swiss multinational pharmaceutical company Novartis.
Context
imatinib is a medication used to treat chronic myelogenous leukaemia and other types 
of cancer. the medication is included in the World health organization (‘who’) model 
list of essential medicines44. It is also included in the Colombian mandatory Health Plan.
Imatinib was formerly commercialised under competitive prices as a generic medi-
cine by a number of incumbents in colombia until 2012, when the swiss multinational 
42 Pricewaterhousecoopers, above n 38.
43 World health organization, Who we are what we do <http://www.who.int/about/en/>
44 World health organization, who Model Lists of Essential Medicines <http://www.who.int/medicines/publi-
cations/essentialmedicines/en/>
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pharmaceutical company Novartis got from the Colombian government the patent over 
the medicine under the trademark Glivec™45.
in 2014, a procedure for declaring the existence of reasons of public interest over the 
medicine imatinib started as a consequence of a special request filed by the colombian 
representative of the nGo Health Action International (‘hai’) –along with some other 
local activist organisations–.
the main argument of the request was high prices of Glivec™ in the Colombian 
market. according to the petitioners, prices of Glivec™ were fixed by novartis following 
a monopoly reasoning instead of competitive and industrial criteria. the situation was 
aggravated with the exclusion of generic forms of imatinib as a consequence of the pa-
tent granted in 2012. For the petitioners, the impact of this monopolistic circumstance 
over the financial stability of the colombian public health system would be huge, con-
sequently affecting all the population46.
the procedure first started as a necessary step towards compulsory licensing of 
Glivec™. according to the international treaties subscribed by the country, prior to 
a decision of compulsory licencing of a privately owned patent, the government must 
analyse the circumstances to consider the existence of reasons of public interest over 
the relevant medicine.
as part of the procedure, the colombian ministry of health and social Protection 
(‘the ministry’) tried to enter into direct negotiations with novartis seeking a voluntary 
reduction of the local price of Glivec™, taking into account that the market analysis 
conducted by the ministry showed that the price of the medicine was relatively high 
compared with international prices and potential local competitors (198% higher)47. 
notwithstanding the invitation from the colombian government, novartis decided 
not to negotiate the price of Glivec™ arguing that it was inconvenient to enter into a 
price negotiation48.
After long discussions and arguments between the Colombian government and No-
vartis, in june 2016 the ministry decided to declare the existence of reasons of public 
interest over the medicine imatinib. as a consequence of this decision, the colombian 
government proceeded to impose a price control regime over Glivec™ (instead of a 
compulsory licence regime).
45 novartis, Que es Glivec? [What is Glivec] <http://www.novartis.com.co/prensa/glivec.shtml>
46 ministry of health and social Protection of the republic of colombia, Special request for declaring the existence 
of reasons of public interest over the medicine imatinib <https://www.minsalud.gov.co/sites/rid/Lists/Bibliotecadi-
gital/ride/vs/met/solicitud-de-una-declaracion-en-el-acceso-al-medicamento-imatinib.pdf>
47 ministry of health and social Protection of the republic of colombia, Análisis de mercado del imatinib 
en colombia y proyección de impacto presupuestal de la declaratoria de razones de interés público [market analysis of 
imatinib in Colombia and projection of the budgetary impact of the declaration of reasons of public 
interest] <https://www.minsalud.gov.co/salud/mt/Paginas/medicamentos-propiedad-intelectual.aspx>
48 ministry of health and social Protection of the republic of colombia, Resolution 2475 of 14 June 2016 
<https://www.minsalud.gov.co/sites/rid/Lists/Bibliotecadigital/ride/de/dij/resolucion-2475-de-2016.
pdf>
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Regulatory action of the Colombian state
according to article 49 of the colombian constitution, health attention and environmental 
well-being are public services under the responsibility of the state, which shall guaran-
tee the access to health promotion, protection and recovery services to all the people.
to accomplish such responsibility, the state is constitutionally entitled of directing 
the provision of health services following the principles of efficiency, universality and 
solidarity49. under similar reasoning, article 366 of the colombian constitution esta-
blishes general wellbeing and the enhancement of people’s life quality as social goals 
of the state, instituting as a fundamental objective the solution of unsatisfied health, 
education, environmental and water supply necessities50.
in accordance with those guidelines, Law 1751 of 2015 established health as an 
autonomous human right of non-renounceable nature. it also provides that the health 
system –under state direction– shall pursue the most effective use of the available eco-
nomic resources, services and technologies in order to guarantee the human right to 
health of all the population51.
in resolution 2475 of 14 june 2016, the ministry explains the reasoning behind the 
decision of declaring the existence of reasons of public interest related to the medicine 
imatinib pursuing the implementation of a regime of direct control of prices over the 
medicine Glivec™, commercialised by novartis.
Based on the constitutional and legal grounds explained above, the ministry presents 
the following arguments to support its decision:
(i) the government’s pharmaceutical public policy52 targets a permanent reduction 
of medicines prices as a strategy to promote the sustainability of the health system.
(ii) the market analysis conducted by the technical committee for the declaration 
of Reasons of Public Interest of the ministry (‘the Committee’) showed that the price of 
Glivec™ was relatively higher compared with international prices and potential local 
competitors (198% higher)53.
(iii) Other studies conducted by the ministry showed that Glivec™ had a monopoly 
status in the market, given the fact that there are not adequate therapeutical substitutes 
that can work as a front line treatment as Glivec™.
(iv) the public funds used by the government to finance medications54 are scarce 
and have a paramount public importance. A price control scheme that simulates a com-
petitive price can help to save public funds while respecting private party rights.
49 Constitución Política de Colombia 1991 [colombian constitution 1991] art 49.
50 ibid., art. 366.
51 Ley 1751 de 2015 [Law 1751 of 2015].
52 Contained in the document conPes 155 of 2012.
53 ministry of health and social Protection of the republic of colombia, above n 45.
54 Either because they are included in the mandatory Health Plan or because they can be recovered through 
the government’s solidarity and guarantee fund.
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it is important to highlight that, even though the ministry had the necessary arguments 
and followed the proper procedure –the declaration of reasons of public interest– to 
impose a compulsory licencing scheme over Glivec™, it opted not to do so.
Being conscious of the intensity of such a decision, the ministry considered that the 
implementation of a regime of direct control of prices based on the simulation of compe-
tition was a reasonable and proportional alternative to compulsory licencing that allowed 
an efficient management of public funds while respecting the iP rights of Novartis55.
Following the decision of the ministry, by december 2016 the colombian national 
commission for medications and medical devices Pricing determined a maximum price 
of Glivec™ following a novel methodology that simulates competitive conditions bet-
ween the patented molecule and its generic counterparts. the decision of the Colombian 
government represents an effective 44% reduction from the original price charged for 
Glivec™ by Novartis in the Country56.
the company has publicly argued that there was no legitimate argument for the Co-
lombian government to declare public interest over imatinib, neither to fix a maximum 
price for their patented medicine Glivec™.
according to novartis’ statement, the declaration of reasons of public interest was 
arbitrary because: (i) the company has never held the monopoly of the molecule  imatinib 
in the country; (ii) the existence of a legal patent over Glivec™ does not affect the ac-
cess of patients to the treatment; (iii) the colombian government has been controlling 
the price of Glivec™ since 2011; (iv) there are no real threats of a supply shortage of 
the medicine, and finally; (v) declaring the existence of reasons of public interest and 
setting a price cap over Glivec™ does not solve the structural financial problems of the 
Colombian public health system57.
Novartis has also publicly rejected the unprecedented decision of the Colombian 
government arguing that it may be against the provisions of the bit signed between 
Colombia and the Swiss Federation58. there are also reports of approaches from agents 
of the united states senate to the colombian embassy in Washington trying to per-
suade the Colombian government to withdraw its intentions to impose price controls 
or compulsory licencing over Glivec™59.
55 ministry of health and social Protection of the republic of colombia, above n 46.
56 ministry of health and social Protection of the republic of colombia, El Gobierno fija el precio del Glivec 
en $ 206 por miligramo [Government fixes the price of Glivec at coP$206 per milligram] <https://www.
minsalud.gov.co/Paginas/el-Gobierno-fija-el-precio-del-Glivec-en-$-206-por-miligramo.aspx>
57 novartis, above n 42.
58 Ibid.
59 el espectador, Las presiones de ee.uu. para que Colombia no regule el precio del imatinib [the pressures of the United 
states to prevent the colombian price regulation of imatinib] (10 may 2016) <http://www.elespectador.
com/noticias/salud/presiones-de-eeuu-colombia-no-regule-el-precio-del-imat-articulo-631535>
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Viability of the investor’s potential claim
Was the price control over Glivec™ in colombia a legitimate exercise of regulatory 
power by the colombian government, a disguised compulsory licensing measure or an 
indirect expropriation?
Price control of Glivec™ in colombia is not the first case of a conflict between a 
multinational company and a state for the protection of iP rights over medicines under 
iia’s. in 2007 the pharmaceutical giant merck publicly attacked the actions of the Bra-
zilian government towards the imposition of a compulsory licence over the medicine 
efavirenz (an antiretroviral drug used to treat aids) patented by the company under the 
trademark stocrin™. similar critiques have followed compulsory licensing decisions in 
india, ecuador, thailand and malaysia60.
other kinds of state actions related to iP rights have been under the spotlight for its 
potential expropriating nature. in the recent and well-known plain packaging cases of 
the multinational tobacco company Philipp morris against the Uruguayan and Australian 
governments, the company has argued that plain packaging restrictions are expropria-
ting since they dispossess the Company of the rightful use of its intellectual property 
and extinguishes the value of the brands without fair and equitable compensation61. 
these cases are a good example of the difficulties of determining the frontier between 
legitimate regulatory actions and compensable indirect expropriation.
how to define then if a regulatory measure restricting iP rights –like the one executed 
by the colombian government controlling Glivec™ prices– is expropriating or not (and 
therefore subject to compensation)? the problem seems to reside in the indeterminacy 
and lack of clarity of the concept indirect expropriation, which opens the door for inves-
tors “to challenge host states measures affecting the commercial exploitation of their iP 
protected goods and services”62.
the viability of the potential claim of Novartis against the Colombian state under 
an international investment law scheme depends on the question of whether a govern-
ment regulation intended to increase access to medicines for the local population (like 
compulsory licences or price controls) is a legitimate action subject to the provisions 
of free trade agreements and iia’s related to iP rights, its exceptions and flexibilities63. 
according to the specialised literature, “the interface between iP protection and expro-
priation is the topic which has so far received most attention amongst the substantive 
standards of treatment an investor can expect under a iia for his iP rights”64.
there will only be a case against the Colombian state if the declaration of reasons 
of public interest related to the medicine imatinib that derived in price limitations over 
60 Grosse ruse-kahn, above n 9, 187.
61 ibid., 188.
62 ibid., 189.
63 ibid., 187.
64 Ibid.
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Glivec™ can be considered a compensable compulsory licensing decision or an indirect 
expropriating action under applicable colombian-swiss agreements.
For solving the issue, there is a crucial instrument that must be taken into account in 
terms of iP rights in the international investment law context: the agreement on trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (‘triPs’) administered by the World trade 
Organization (‘wto’)65. this agreement “establishes minimum levels of protection that 
each government has to give to the intellectual property of fellow wto members”66 ba-
sed on the principles of non-discrimination, national treatment, most favoured nation 
treatment and fair and equitable treatment67.
the triPs agreement is highly relevant to the discussion of the tension between 
pharmaceutical iP rights and the extent of governmental regulations. the agreement 
provides a scheme of exceptions and flexibilities to iP rights protection in order to de-
fend “public health and nutrition, and to promote the public interest in sectors of vital 
importance to their socio-economic and technological development”68. the agreement 
also provides that states may undertake suitable measures “to prevent the abuse of inte-
llectual property rights by right holders or the resort to practices which unreasonably 
restrain trade or adversely affect the international transfer of technology”69.
Part of this regime of exceptions and flexibilities is compulsory licensing of me-
dicines as a flexibility of patent protection. article 31 of the triPs agreement allows 
member states to legitimately issue compulsory licenses over pharmaceutical patented 
rights following broad principles of: (i) previous negotiation of voluntary licence with 
the patent holder on reasonable commercial terms; (ii) limited scope and time duration 
of the compulsory licence; (iii) non-exclusion of the patent holder of his right to pro-
duce; (iv) the payment of adequate remuneration to the patent holder; (v) submission 
to judicial review of the compulsory licensing decision and the terms of the adequate 
remuneration to the patent holder70.
We should remind that, despite following the procedure towards the imposition of 
a compulsory licence over Glivec™, the decision of the colombian government was 
limited to a declaration of public interest reasons over the medication imatinib and the 
consequential imposition of a price cap over Glivec™, without breaking novartis patent 
rights in terms of compulsory licensing (which would have entail adequate remuneration 
under the triPs agreement).
Since the regulatory action of the Colombian government was not a compulsory 
license over Glivec™, the concrete case of a potential claim of novartis should be fur-
65 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (‘triPs’), annex 1c of the World trade agree-
ment (marrakesh, 15 april 1994, 1869 unts 299).
66 World trade organization, Intellectual property: protection and enforcement <https://www.wto.org/english/
thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm7_e.htm>
67 triPs.
68 triPs, art. 8.
69 Ibid.
70 triPs, art. 31.
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therly analysed under the provisions related to the protection of iP rights contained in 
chapter 6 of the Free trade agreement between the republic of colombia and the eFta 
states (including the swiss confederation), which establishes that “the Parties reaffirm 
their existing rights and obligations, including the right to apply the exceptions and 
to make use of the flexibilities, under the triPs agreement, and any other multilateral 
agreement related to intellectual property”71.
in development of such recognition, the agreement determines that parties may 
take appropriate measures “to prevent the abuse of intellectual property rights by right 
holders or the resort to practices which unreasonably restrain trade or adversely affect 
the international transfer of technology”72, in accordance with paragraph 2 of article 8 
of the triPs Agreement.
the colombia-eFta agreement also provides that parties may “adopt measures ne-
cessary to protect public health and nutrition, and to promote the public interest in 
sectors of vital importance to their socio-economic and technological development”73, 
in harmony with paragraph 1 article 8 of the triPs Agreement. According to the spe-
cialised doctrine:
“these safeguards for compulsory licenses and often other forms of limitations to iP rights 
seem to offer sufficient legal security for the host state that it may continue to rely on flexi-
bilities in triPs and other iP treaties. at the same time, these safeguard clauses offer investors 
predictability that the more specific international iP standards will in part govern the question 
of (indirect) expropriation under investment protection”74.
Based on the safeguard clauses in the colombia-eFta free trade agreement and the appli-
cable flexibilities provided by the triPs agreement, we can argue that the price control 
over Glivec™ imposed by the Colombian government can be considered a necessary 
measure to protect public health and therefore promote the public interest. consequently, 
novartis is not entitled to any kind of compensation under a compulsory licensing sche-
me, neither on the grounds of indirect expropriation.
our conclusion can be complemented with a benchmark analysis of the expropria-
ting potential of the colombian government action. as announced in the first section of 
this paper, the united states and the canadian models of bits, as well as the principles 
developed by arbitral tribunals in investment disputes, are commonly used benchmarks 
for evaluating the expropriating nature of a government’s action. these criteria can 
be summarized as: (i) the grade of intrusion in the investors’ property right; (ii) the 
economic impact of the regulatory action; (iii) the magnitude of the interference of 
the regulatory action with the reasonable expectations of the foreign investor; (iv) the 
71 Free Trade Agreement between The Republic of Colombia and The efta States, art. 6.4.1.
72 ibid., art. 6.1.5.
73 ibid., art. 6.2.4.
74 Grosse ruse-kahn, above n 9, 187.
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nature of the regulatory action –including its drive and background–and; (v) the pro-
portionality of the regulatory action.
Applying these criteria to the price control over Glivec™ allows us to conclude that:
(i) the grade of the intrusion in Novartis property right was reduced in terms of the 
economic impact of the measure on the value of the investment75. the degree to which the 
price control affected the price set by novartis may be considered high (44% reduction 
from the original price), but seems reasonable taking into account that the original price 
was 198% higher compared with international prices and potential local competitors.
(ii) From the perspective of the grade of interference of the regulatory action with 
the reasonable expectations of novartis, is crucial to take into account that “the grant of 
an iP right as such therefore does not provide for any legitimate expectations that those 
rights are not subject to any of the commonly used limits to IP protection”76.
the reasonable expectations of novartis should have been that colombia would 
act within the exceptions and flexibilities to iP rights protection established in both the 
colombia-eFta and triPs agreements, which the country effectively did by setting a 
price control over Glivec™ as a necessary measure to protect public health and there-
fore promote the public interest.
(iii) Finally, from the point of view of the nature and proportionality of the gover-
nment action, the customary international law doctrine of police powers argues that a 
“state does not incur in responsibility for the legitimate and bona fide exercise of sove-
reign police powers–subject to specific commitments and an analysis of proportionality 
or reasonableness”77. according to the cited international investment law literature, “any 
public health motivated measures such as compulsory licenses for patented drugs or plain 
tobacco packaging will thus generally benefit from this doctrine”78.
the reasonableness of the price control imposed by the Colombian government was 
based on the public policy target of the government towards a permanent reduction of 
medicines prices, on the evidenced high price of Glivec™ in the colombian market 
compared with international prices and potential local competitors, the lack of adequate 
therapeutical substitutes which gave Glivec™ a monopoly status, and the necessity to 
guarantee the sustainability of the public health system through competitive medicine 
prices. its proportionality was based on the fact that the price cap was defined following 
a novel methodology that simulates competitive conditions between the patented mo-
lecule and its generic counterparts.
75 ‘the impact measures have on the economic value of an iP right certainly depend on the individual 
circumstances –such as the terms of the compulsory license; the amount and price of parallel imported 
drugs; and the degree to which price controls affect the price set by the patent holder’. ibid., 190.
76 ibid., 191.
77 Ibid.
78 Ibid.
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We can accordingly conclude that there is a reduced viability of a potential claim of 
Novartis against the Republic of Colombia for the declaration of reasons of public inter-
est related to the medicine imatinib that derived in price limitations on Glivec™. the 
regulatory action of the Colombian government was neither a compensable compulsory 
licensing nor a compensable indirect expropriating measure.
Our conclusion is endorsed by the specialised literature which states that:
“As long as their character and underlying rationale [of the regulatory actions] consists of good 
faith public welfare goals such as facilitating access to medicines and they are non-discrimi-
natory and proportional in nature, investors are unlikely to succeed with claims of indirect 
expropriation”79.
C. Case 2: Restriction of mining activities in moorland ecosystems
Foreword
Environmental compliance and sustainable development are also highly sensitive matters 
when it comes to the tension between legitimate regulatory actions of host governments 
and compensable indirect expropriation of foreign investors’ property rights. the inten-
sification of this tension may be attributed to the increment of environmental awareness 
and climate change mitigation commitments.
it would be fair to affirm that the approach of states towards environmental protec-
tion and sustainable development has been strengthening in the last 20 years80, despite 
the recent reluctance of some governments to acknowledge the existence of climate 
change and its direct relation to human activities81.
ever since the signature of the Kyoto protocol in 1997, the scientific community 
and environmental activists have been pushing for stronger states’ commitments towards 
the reduction of emissions for mitigating climate change. the recent Paris Agreement 
“to combat climate change and to accelerate and intensify the actions and investments 
needed for a sustainable low carbon future”82, and the outstanding follow-up meeting 
held in marrakesh in november 2016 which “successfully demonstrated to the world 
that the implementation of the Paris Agreement is underway and the constructive spirit 
of multilateral cooperation on climate change continues”83, are good examples of the 
79 Ibid.
80 united nations Framework convention on climate change, Kyoto Protocol <http://unfccc.int/kyoto_pro-
tocol/items/2830.php>
81 mazin sidahmed, Climate change denial in the Trump cabinet: where do his nominees stand? the Guardian (16 
december 2016) <https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2016/dec/15/trump-cabinet-climate-
change-deniers>
82 united nations Framework convention on climate change, Summary of the Paris Agreement <http://big-
picture.unfccc.int/#content-the-paris-agreemen>
83 united nations Framework convention on climate change, Marrakech Climate Change Conference - November 
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substantial joined commitments from most of the world’s nations towards the mitigation 
of climate change through the restriction of environmentally harmful human activities.
this trend of state actions is not only noticeable in the fight against climate change. 
state’s environmental regulations and restrictions are becoming stricter thanks to the 
availability of more accurate scientific information about the effects of human activities 
in the environment, the increment of public awareness about environmental conserva-
tion and the pressure over governments to take positive actions towards its protection.
the public attention is set on the way governments manage the exploitation of 
natural resources and the environmental accountability of private companies. Public 
endorsement of these issues has taken environmental regulations to the top places in 
political agendas.
the difficulty that surfaces from the perspective of international investment law is 
the ponderation between foreign investors’ property rights and governments’ environ-
mental regulations (which are getting harsher every day). many states’ commitments 
under iia’s were subscribed before the upsurging trend of environmental awareness, back 
in times when light regulations were a common strategy to attract foreign investments 
(particularly in developing countries).
in the present days, compliance with international environmental commitments 
and higher public pressures are making governments to strengthen green regulations, 
increasing the spectrum of possible conflicts with consolidated property rights of foreign 
investors subject to protection under iia’s.
the fundamental question that arises from this issue is how to determine if a foreign 
investor is entitled to compensation following an environmental regulatory action of a 
host government that entails some sort of deprivation of its property rights? Does the 
paramount value of environmental protection represent a reasonable and proportional 
justification for the exercise of regulatory powers without compensation?
Within this background, in the lines below we are going to discuss the recent de-
cision of the colombian government to restrict the allowed area for the exploitation 
of a gold-silver reserve by the canadian company eco oro minerals corP, which was 
taken following a decision of the colombian constitutional court to forbid all mining 
and hydrocarbons activities in moorland ecosystems.
Context
eco oro minerals corP (tsx: ‘eom’) is a canadian publicly-traded precious metals ex-
ploration and mining development company. it arrived to colombia in 1994 with the 
purpose to undertake the exploration and exploitation of gold-silver in a project called 
Angostura located near a moorland ecosystem known as Santurban (north-eastern colombia).
According to the information provided by the Company:
2016 <http://unfccc.int/meetings/marrakech_nov_2016/meeting/9567.php>
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“eco oro was one of the first foreign mining companies to invest in the country’ s gold mining 
sector. since the mid-1990s, the company has invested over us$250 million to develop the 
angostura mining project (the “Project”) by completing more than 360,000 meters of drilling 
and 3,000 meters of underground development. as a result of these investments, eco oro 
declared resources for the angostura deposit where none existed before, and doubled those 
resources between 1999 and 2015. the deposit is now one of the largest in colombia”84.
the company (formerly known as Greystar) has legally developed mining exploration 
activities in the area as the holder of the mining title contained in the concession contract 
3452 signed with the colombian government in 2007, which had an original duration 
of 20 years. the investments made by the company were supported by its confidence in 
the international investment policy of the colombian state, as well as the government’s 
support to the project –once considered of national interest–.
the project was partially funded by the International Financial Corporation (‘iFc’) 
–member of the World Bank group–, which invested usd$9.6 million in equity (12.5% 
of the company’s shares) in 2009[85], “to fund completion of a bankable feasibility study 
(bFs), an environmental and social impact assessment (esia) and other ground works to 
prepare for the construction of an open-pit mine”86.
roughly 50 percent of the area of the concession contract 3452 was believed to be 
part of a moorland ecosystem87. moorlands (locally known as Páramos) are ecosystems 
that capture water from fog and supply it to lowlands88: “healthy páramos also capture 
large amounts of carbon, mitigating climate change, and provide refuge for hundreds 
of threatened species, including the iconic spectacled bear”89. moorlands are subject 
to high levels of protective measures given their importance for water supply, endemic 
animal and vegetal species and natural weather regulation90.
the moorland of santurban (where the angostura gold-silver deposit is located) is 
an alpine tundra ecosystem considered a “biological corridor characterised by herba-
ceous vegetation that ranges from 3,000 to 3,800 metres (9,842 to 12,467 feet) above 
84 eco oro minerals corp, Eco Oro files Request for Arbitration against Colombia (09 december 2016) <http://
www.eco-oro.com/s/newsreleases.asp?reportid=774271&_type=news-releases&_title=eco-oro-
files-request-for-arbitration-against-colombia>
85 Center for International Environmental Law (‘ciel’), World Bank divests from Eco Oro Minerals and its mining 
project in the Colombian Páramos (21 december 2016) <http://www.ciel.org/news/9504/>
86 office of the compliance advisor ombudsman for the international Finance corporation & multilateral 
investment Guarantee agency members of the World Bank Group (‘cao’), cao Investigation of ifc Investment 
in: Eco Oro Minerals Corporation Limited (#27961) <http://www.cao-ombudsman.org/cases/document-links/
documents/caocomplianceinvestigationreportoniFcinvestmentinecoorominerals-english.pdf>
87 mining journal, Eco Oro requests arbitration (15 december 2016) <http://www.mining-journal.com/world/
centralsouth-america/eco-oro-requests-arbitration/>
88 Interamerican Association for Environmental Defense (‘aida’), Protecting the Santurban Páramo from Angostura 
Mining Project <http://www.aida-americas.org/protecting_the_santurban_paramo_from_angostura_pro-
ject>
89 Ibid.
90 Ibid.
109Discussing the tension between states’ right to regulate and foreign investment protection
con-texto • revista de derecho y economía • n.º 47 • enero-junio 2017 • pp. 89-119
d
e
r
e
c
h
o
 e
c
o
n
ó
m
ic
o
  
sea level. it provides water to over 2.2 million people that inhabit the metropolitan 
areas of Bucaramanga and cucuta, and 21 other municipalities in santander and norte 
de Santander”91.
in 2009 eco oro applied for an environmental license to develop an open-pit gold 
and silver mine within the area of concession contract 3452. the national authority of 
Environmental Licences (a governmental agency subordinated to the Colombian mi-
nistry of Environment and Sustainable Development) rejected the license application 
in 2010 arguing lack of compliance with recent modifications of the colombian mining 
code, as well as the prohibition to undertake mining activities in moorland ecosystems 
in Colombia92.
up until 2014 there was no official delimitation of the moorland of santurban for 
environmental purposes. the official delimitation of the protected moorland and the 
definition of the allowances for natural resources exploitation purposes took place in 
december 2014. With this decision, the colombian government announced that exis-
ting mining titles with effective licences for the exploration and exploitation of natural 
resources were going to be allowed and respected up until the expiration of the relevant 
licences93.
Judicial intervention and regulatory action of the Colombian state
in decision c-035 released 8 February 2016, the colombian constitutional court ruled 
the partial invalidation of article 173 of Law 1753 of 2015 which contained regulations 
related to mining exploration and exploitation activities in moorland ecosystems94.
article 173 of Law 1753 of 2015 provided a general rule of exclusion of agricultu-
ral activities, mineral and hydrocarbons exploration and exploitation activities, as well 
as the construction of hydrocarbons refineries in areas officially defined as moorland 
ecosystems95.
Paragraph 1 of the article provided an exception for those titles granted before a 
given date if they already had an environmental licence, being aware of the existence 
of previously granted mining licences over areas that could potentially be part of moor-
land ecosystems. in those cases, exploration and exploitation activities could continue 
91 environmental justice organisations Liabilities and trade (‘ejolt’), The Angostura Mining Project in the Paramo 
of Santurban, Colombia (25 February 2013) <http://www.ejolt.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/
Fs_002_angostura.pdf>
92 cao, above n 84.
93 el tiempo, Minambiente delimita 98.954 hectáreas, el 76 % del páramo de Santurbán [the ministry of Environ-
ment delimitates 98.954 hectares, 76% of the santurban moorland] (19 december 2014) <http://www.
eltiempo.com/colombia/otras-ciudades/delimitacion-del-paramo-de-santurban/14996735>
94 Corte Constitucional [colombian constitutional court], c-035, 8 February 2016.
95 Ley 1751 de 2015 [Law 1751 of 2015], art. 173.
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during its original duration under a strict supervision of the environmental authority and 
without right of term extension96.
the court considered that the exception included in paragraph 1 was unconstitutional 
given the fragility, sensibility and vulnerability of moorland ecosystems and the special 
protection that they have within the colombian constitutional framework. therefore, 
the exception was excluded and all mining and hydrocarbons activities were banned 
from moorland ecosystems97, included 50.73% of the area of the concession contract 
3452 subscribed with eco oro.
Following the decision of the constitutional court, the colombian government 
(through the national mining agency, entitled of the administration of mining titles) 
decided to exclude from the concession contract 3452 all the areas that were considered 
part of the moorland of santurban and were, therefore, banned for the development of 
mining exploration and exploitation activities98.
According to eco oro, the Angostura project cannot be developed after the decision 
of the Colombian government and the Country’s Constitutional Court99. the Company 
stated that:
“eco oro’s rights are faced with the threat of further encroachments given the risk that the 
Constitutional Court and National mining Agency will issue future decisions further redu-
cing the area accessible to eco oro. as a consequence of these uncertainties, the Project 
cannot currently be licensed. the result of Colombia’s measures is that resources remaining 
in concession 3452 that could potentially be accessed are insufficient to justify the signifi-
cant investments required to develop an underground mine. the Project has been rendered 
unviable”100.
the continuation of the project was also affected by some criticisms made to the role 
of iFc’s participation. the office of the compliance advisor ombudsman for the inter-
national Finance corporation & multilateral investment Guarantee agency members of 
the World Bank Group (‘cao’) conducted an investigation of the iFc investment in the 
Company eco oro, particularly about the application of iFc’s sustainability Framework 
which includes its Policy on social and environmental sustainability (2006 sustainability 
Policy) and Performance Standards101.
96 ibid., par. 1.
97 corte constitucional [colombia constitutional court], above n 91.
98 marco velÁsquez-ruiz, La increíble historia de la demanda de Eco Oro Minerals contra Colombia [the incredible 
story of the claim of eco oro minerals against colombia] el tiempo (15 december 2016) <http://blogs.
eltiempo.com/desmarcado/2016/12/15/la-increible-historia-eco-oro/>
99 eco oro minerals corp, Colombian National Mining Agency Deprives Eco Oro of its Mining Rights (11 August 
2016) <http://www.eco-oro.com/s/newsreleases.asp?reportid=760306&_type=news-releases&_
title=colombian-national-mining-agency-deprives-eco-oro-of-its-mining-rights>
100 eco oro minerals corp, above n 82.
101 cao, above n 84.
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the office of the ombudsman found that “iFc’s appraisal and supervision docu-
mentation did not promptly capture regulatory actions relevant to iFc’s assessment of 
client capacity and commitment”102, that “iFc supervision documentation does not show 
substantive progress on the completion of necessary studies, such as an adequate bio-
diversity baseline study or critical habitat assessment”103, and also that “iFc was aware 
of the project’s proximity to the páramo at the time of iFc’s investment, and identified 
this as a risk at appraisal as there was potential for the mine to impact the páramo”104.
After a number of criticisms derived from the decision of the Colombian Constitu-
tional court and the national mining agency, and the conclusions of the report of the 
Ombudsman105, the iFc decided to withdraw their support to the project and proceeded 
to remove their equity investments in the Company106. eco oro is currently conducting 
a divestment process.
Viability of the investor’s claim
in december 2016, the company filed a request for the institution of arbitration 
proceedings before the International Centre for Settlement of Investment  Disputes 
(‘icsid’) for the alleged breach of bits and free trade agreements between Canada 
and Colombia107.
in its request for arbitration, the company argues that the colombian state breached 
the stipulations of the Free trade Agreement subscribed with Canada by reducing the 
area of the mining concession contract as a consequence of the ruling of the Constitu-
tional Court about mining activities in moorland ecosystems.
claiming to be a protected investor under the canada-colombia Free trade agree-
ment, the company believes that the colombian state failed to provide fair and equitable 
treatment “through arbitrary, inconsistent and disproportionate measures”108, resulting in a 
frustration of its legitimate expectations109. the Company also argues that the regulatory 
action of the colombian state represents an unlawful expropriation of the company’s 
investment, since the reduction of the accessible area of the mining title destroyed the 
value of the investment. the Company concludes that the Colombian government failed 
to provide prompt, adequate and effective compensation110.
the Company considers that:
102 Ibid.
103 Ibid.
104 Ibid.
105 ciel, above n 83.
106 mining Watch canada, World Bank Divests from Eco Oro Minerals and Mining in Colombian Páramos (20 decem-
ber 2016) <http://miningwatch.ca/news/2016/12/20/world-bank-divests-eco-oro-minerals-and-mining-
colombian-p-ramos>
107 Eco Oro minerals Corp. v. Republic of Colombia (icsid case n.º arb/16/41).
108 eco oro minerals corp, above n 82.
109 Ibid.
110 Ibid.
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“Colombia’s measures have not only deprived Eco Oro of its investment but also the returns 
that would have resulted from the Company’s investment of hundreds of millions of dollars 
over the past two decades in reliance upon Colombia’s commitments. Eco Oro is therefore 
asserting its entitlement to recover the losses to its investment resulting from Colombia’s 
breaches. the amount of such losses will be determined at a later stage in the Arbitration”111.
the arbitration is still at an early stage. the acting secretary-General of the icsid regis-
tered the request for the institution of arbitration proceedings on 29 december 2016. 
the tribunal has not yet been constituted112.
Is the claim of eco oro against the colombian state viable? Was the reduction of the 
workable area of the mining title an expropriating decision subject to prompt, adequate 
and effective compensation?
as we have discussed along this paper, the answer to those questions depends on the 
analysis of whether the regulatory action undertaken by the colombian government as 
a consequence of a judicial ruling should be considered or not an expropriation subject 
to compensation under the canada-colombia Free trade agreement.
the complexity of the issue is the commented tension between environmental 
regulation and the protection of investors’ rights in international investment law113. 
according to the specialised literature, “environmental expropriation, or expropriation 
proceedings based on environmental regulations, has traditionally formed part of the 
claims for compensation raised in investor–state disputes”114.
A distinctive feature of this tension is the changeability of environmental regulations. 
the release of new environmental regulations by a host nation may change the legal 
and financial framework under which an investment was initially made, consequently 
affecting the future viability of the investors’ venture in terms of maintaining the value 
of the invested assets115.
Upcoming environmental regulations that affect foreign investors’ proprietary rights 
have been traditionally considered as cases of compensable indirect expropriation116. 
Regarding the approach of arbitrators to the assessment of the rightfulness of an en-
vironmental regulation, international investment law doctrine has traditionally called 
for a detailed analysis of the reasonability of the governmental action in terms of the 
111 Ibid.
112 International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (‘icsid’), Case Details Eco Oro Minerals Corp. 
v. Republic of Colombia (icsid Case n.º arb/16/41) <https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/cases/casedetail.
aspx?caseno=arb/16/41>
113 treves, seatzu and trevisanut (eds), above n 5, 224.
114 ibid., 222.
115 ibid., 225.
116 ‘as stated in the previously mentioned santa elena award, all measures that constitute an expropria-
tion – including those based on reasons of environmental protection – lead to an obligation upon the 
expropriating state to pay compensation to the expropriated investor. customary international law 
does not exclude compensation when an expropriation is based on public purpose, is not arbitrary or 
discriminatory and respects the principles of due process.’ ibid., 225.
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strength of the scientific grounds that justified the measure117. the scientific authority 
of an environmental regulation is the cornerstone of the legitimacy of regulatory actions 
when measured against the protection of foreign investors’ rights.
once the validity of the scientific grounds of the decision has been settled, com-
pliance with non-arbitrary, non-discrimination, due process and compensation princi-
ples is verified in order to conclude if the regulatory action was lawfully conducted and 
compensated as an indirect expropriation:
“the main concern of arbitral tribunals should be on whether the measure taken by the host 
state is one based on an actual concern for the protection of the environment (public purpo-
se). once this requirement is satisfied, the non-arbitrary and non-discriminatory nature of 
the measure, the respect of due process and the payment of compensation become to some 
extent secondary aspects. as long as compensation was paid, the investor was involved in 
the proceedings and the measure is neither arbitrary nor discriminatory, the action of the 
state must be considered legal under international law”118.
this tradition has radically changed in recent years given a new set of provisions related 
to the expropriating nature of environmental regulations that is being included in most of 
the bits –inspired by the 2004 and 2012 us model bits–. as explained in the first section 
of this paper, annex B to the us model bits encloses the following provision: “except in 
rare circumstances, non-discriminatory regulatory actions by a Party that are designed 
and applied to protect legitimate public welfare objectives, such as public health, safety, 
and the environment, do not constitute indirect expropriations”119.
this vanguard provision represents a shift in traditional rules on expropriation. it 
entails that an environmental regulatory measure taken by a host state that affects pro-
prietary rights of a foreign investor shall not be considered an indirect expropriation –and 
therefore should not be compensated– when is designed and applied by the government 
to protect legitimate public welfare objectives related to environmental conservation, 
provided that the regulatory action is based on a non-discriminatory basis120.
the applicable Free trade agreement to the case under our examination contains 
an exclusion provision such as the one described above. annex 811 of the investment 
chapter of the canada-colombia Free trade agreement (applicable to the claim raised 
117 ‘an arbitral tribunal considering an expropriation claim arising out of a purported environmental measure 
should limit its inquiry to determining whether the science underlying the risk determination has the 
minimal attributes of scientific inquiry – that is, whether the evidence of risk has been derived through 
the application of legitimate scientific methods and procedures, and is probative of a potential for ad-
verse effects. [...] once an arbitral tribunal has confirmed that the evidence is scientific and probative, 
it should accept the legitimate environmental basis for the measure.’ j. martin waGner, ‘international 
investment, expropriation and environmental Protection’ (1999) 29 Golden Gate U. L. Rev., 465, 534.
118 treves, seatzu and trevisanut (eds.), above n 5, 224.
119 office of the united states trade representative, above n 20.
120 treves, seatzu and trevisanut (eds.), above n 5, 225.
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by eco oro) includes the following provision regarding the interpretation of indirect 
expropriations under the agreement:
“the Parties confirm their shared understanding that:
(…)
(b) except in rare circumstances, such as when a measure or series of measures is so severe 
in the light of its purpose that it cannot be reasonably viewed as having been adopted in 
good faith, non-discriminatory measures by a Party that are designed and applied to protect 
legitimate public welfare objectives, for example health, safety and the protection of the 
environment, do not constitute indirect expropriation”121.
the applicable provision of the agreement establishes that an environmental regulatory 
action taken by any of the participant states does not constitute indirect expropriation 
(and thus is no subject to compensation) provided that the governmental action was 
non-discriminatory and intended to protect legitimate welfare objectives related to the 
environment.
the provision goes further and determines that the rare circumstances that will exclu-
de the application of this exception are related to the reasonableness, severity and good 
faith inspiration of the relevant regulatory measure. this means that a certain regulatory 
action purportedly conducted to protect a legitimate public welfare objective (such as 
the environment) shall not be excluded from the general rules of indirect expropriation 
whenever it can be reasonably considered as unproportioned and unfair.
the provision described above sets the benchmark for the assessment of the viability 
of the claim of eco oro against the colombian state. the regulatory action taken by the 
government entailed the restriction of roughly 50% of the area of the mining title held by 
the Company. the governmental measure was the consequence of a judicial ruling that 
reinforced the protection of moorland ecosystems established in the Law 1753 of 2015 
by determining that no mining activities were acceptable in areas belonging to those 
environments. the ruling of the Colombian Constitutional court was based on several 
scientific evidence about the fragility, sensibility and vulnerability of moorland ecosys-
tems and about the potential harm of the development of mining activities within them.
the action of the colombian government was, therefore, a non-discriminatory 
measure applied to protect the Santurban moorland ecosystem as a legitimate public wel-
fare objective. the measure taken by the colombian government can be considered as 
proportional and adopted in good faith, taking into account that only the area located 
within the official delimitation of the moorland was subject to exclusion of the mining 
title, leaving approximately 50% of the total area of the title suitable for the development 
of mining activities by the holder.
121 Canada-Colombia Free Trade Agreement, chapter eight, annex 811.
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these observations allow us to conclude that the decision of the Colombian gover-
nment shall not be considered a case of compensable indirect expropriation following 
the provisions of annex 811 of the investment chapter of the canada-colombia Free 
trade Agreement.
III. CONCLUSIONS
in the first section of this research paper we discussed the nature of iia’s as an instrument 
used by states to attract foreign investments within their borders and obtain favourable 
treatment to local investors in counterpart nations. We also examined how states com-
promise a certain degree of sovereignty in this kind of agreements through the inclusion 
of legal stability agreements, stabilisation clauses, compensation for expropriation, and 
fair & equitable treatment provisions. the purpose of these sort of stipulations is to re-
duce political risk by restricting the scope of the states’ regulatory powers.
the research conducted in the first section of this paper showed that the legitimate 
exercise of regulatory powers within iia’s enters in conflict with the protection of foreign 
investors property rights when it comes to sensitive areas that have a high impact in 
the public interest, politics and public perception. these sensitive areas include human 
rights, health, safety, labour standards and the environment.
the conflict is represented in the scope and extent of the notion of indirect expro-
priation. even though the indeterminacy and lack of clarity of the concept makes it 
difficult to solve the tension between the legitimate exercise of regulatory powers and 
foreign investments protection, we could find some helpful principles (developed from 
international customary law, benchmark model agreements and arbitral decisions) that 
contribute to define when a regulatory action should be considered expropriating, and 
therefore subject to fair and equitable compensation.
Given the fact that the application of such principles requires the analysis of the 
circumstances of particular cases, in the second section of this research paper we con-
ducted the discussion of two recent paramount cases that involve regulatory actions of 
the Colombian state and property rights of foreign investors. Both cases were related to 
those sensitive areas of high tension between government action and investors’ rights: 
pharmaceutical iP rights vs public health interests in the first case, consolidated mining 
titles vs environmental protection in the second case.
the examination of these cases showed us the difficulties when defining if a go-
vernmental regulatory action is legitimate and non-compensable or if it is subject to 
compensation as an indirect expropriation. it also demonstrated that the nature of this 
kind of disputes makes them highly contingent and fundamentally dependent on the 
interpretation of arbitral tribunals.
By applying the criteria presented in the first section of the paper, and the relevant 
provisions of applicable iias and bits, we were able to conclude that the claims of foreign 
investors against the colombian state are not viable. We observed that in both cases 
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the government’s actions can be considered a non-compensable legitimate exercise of 
regulatory powers under the applicable agreements.
our research showed how the recommendation contained in annex B to the us model 
bits –which provides that a regulatory action of a host nation should not be considered 
as an indirect expropriation when it is adopted on a non-discriminatory basis and is in-
tended to protect public interest objectives (e.g. health or the environment)– has been 
adopted in a fair amount of the most recent bits worldwide, including the investment 
chapter of the canada-colombia Free trade agreement.
as shown by our case analysis, this provision represents a major threat for foreign 
investors since it entails an exception to the general rules of expropriation applicable 
in case of deprivation of investors’ proprietary rights as a consequence of governmental 
regulations. the cases of Novartis and eco oro demonstrate how such provision shifts 
political risk towards investors when it comes to legitimate regulations adopted to pro-
tect public health or the environment.
the recommendation that follows the findings of our research is that investors should 
pay specific attention to the existence of this kind of clauses during the assessment of 
political risk in the host country, and provide efficient mechanisms (e.g. insurances, gover-
nment agreements, etc.) that help mitigate the financial impact of such risk in the future.
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